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Global energy use has expanded at unprecedented rates to keep up with the demands of growing 
economies and populations.  Issues such as climate change mitigation, sustainable development, 
and energy security have complicated energy expansion, and countries worldwide are 
reevaluating their current sources of energy, where it comes from, and how much of it they 
utilize. Renewable energy (RE) technologies have emerged as the answer for many countries’ 
energy problems satisfying the need for cleaner technology while still expanding energy supplies 
as a tool for further economic development. These new technologies, however, face significant 
market barriers that impede the uptake of new RE technologies and necessitate government 
intervention. 
 The research in the paper analyzes the impact of the quota obligation policy, more 
commonly called the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in the United States (US), on the 
adoption of wind power.  The first analysis in the paper observes past regulatory policies and 
applies what is learned from their implementation to the RPS.  The manner in which electric 
utilities responded is also examined to determine how the utilities may respond to further 
regulatory mandates such as a federal RPS.  The second analysis utilizes data from the 35 states 
with an RPS in estimating a structural model of wind power development which accounts for 
particular characteristics of the RPS target and other drivers of wind power development such as 
state economic and population factors.  This research shows that several other factors play a key 
role in increasing wind capacity within US states in addition to the RPS.  These factors include a 
state’s wind energy potential, state GDP, and state population change.  Additionally, it was found 
that there is a momentum effect associated with time since RPS adoption and that increases in 
wind energy prices do not negatively affect development in states with an RPS.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy use is expanding globally at unprecedented rates to keep up with the demands of a 
growing world population and continued economic growth.  The International Energy Agency 
(IEA), for instance, estimates that primary energy demand will increase globally by 55 percent 
between 2005 and 2030, and during that same period in developing countries, where economies 
and population are expected to grow fastest, the demand is projected to grow by 74 percent 
(Avato and Coony 2008, xiii).  This situation forces countries worldwide to reevaluate their 
current sources of energy and how much of it they utilize.  Both technical and behavioral change 
is imminent as the world faces the fact that no known energy source is free of significant 
limitations, liabilities, or uncertainties in relation to international economic, environmental, and 
security objectives (Holdren 2006, 4).   
This paper focuses on the role of renewable energy policies, in particular the renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS), on wind power adoption in the United States (US).  Under a two-stage 
research design, past regulatory policies are first observed, as well as how electric utilities 
responded to these policies.  Second, utilizing newly generated and other publicly available data, 
a quantitative analysis of wind power adoption in US states is conducted using regression 
analysis. 
1.1 RENEWABLE ENERGY AS AN ANSWER 
 
Several issues are currently at the forefront of politics—economic growth, sustainable 
international development, climate change, and national and international security.  These top 
issues illustrate the complex, evolving, and interconnected nature of the economic, 
environmental, and security aims that the 21
st
 century energy strategy must serve (Holdren 2006, 
3).  Many answers to the current energy situation and its diverse goals point to new and 
improved clean energy technologies.  Renewable energy (RE) technologies are among the most 
popular of this broad set of clean energy technologies.    
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 Although definitions of RE electricity vary, it is widely accepted that RE technologies 
include any electricity produced from a renewable fuel source such as sunlight, wind, geothermal 
heat, wave or tidal energy, running water and organic matter (Berry and Jaccard 2001, 263).  
These fuels are more commonly associated with a certain technology such as photovoltaic cells 
or wind turbines.  RE technologies enable shifts in the trajectory of the energy sector in many 
different ways, allowing it to deliver improved services, to become more efficient, and to 
respond to environmental concerns such as air pollution and climate change (Sagar and van der 
Zwaan 2006, 2601).  They usually have significantly lower social and environmental impacts 
and risks when compared to electricity derived from non-renewable fossil fuels such as fewer 
smog-contributing emissions and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases (Berry and Jaccard 
2001, 264).  Furthermore, many of these technologies will improve energy access and energy 
systems reliability and reduce the impact of high and volatile energy prices and disruptions in 
individual fuel supplies (Avato and Coony 2008, xiii-xiv).  Renewable electricity also has the 
potential to enhance energy security by increasing supply diversity and increasing the use of 
indigenous fuels or technologies.  RE supports economic development through higher labor 
intensity, reduced payments on imported fuels, and new opportunities for local technologies or 
expertise (Berry and Jaccard 2001, 264). 
 Despite these benefits, RE sources are, on average, more expensive than conventional 
electricity sources when compared on a financial cost basis, and because of this, electricity 
producers have concentrated their investment on conventional technologies.  New RE 
technologies, therefore, even after their technical feasibility has been demonstrated, face a 
number of barriers such as cost, infrastructure needs, slow capital stock turnover, market 
organization, and information and financing constraints (Sagar and van der Zwaan 2006, 2603-
2604).  All of these barriers can impede or constrain the uptake of new technologies and imply a 
need for government intervention, insofar as policies and regulations can create incentives for 
and eliminate barriers to the effective acquisition, absorption, and deployment of technology 
(Gallagher, Holdren, Sagar 2006, 206).  Given the tendency of market investment to focus on the 
financial dimension, governments have developed an array of policies to improve the financial 
situation of RE technologies.  This paper will evaluate one particular policy, the quota 
obligation, designed to benefit RE technologies. 
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1.2 THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
The thesis begins with a discussion of the quota obligation policy, more commonly called the 
RPS in the US, and its different design features.  A review of the various RPS policies adopted in 
US states will follow.  Wind power development in the US is then observed.   The third section 
of the paper outlines the two-stage research design including a literature review of previous 
research on determinants of wind power adoption and methodology.  In the first stage of the 
research, past regulatory policies are observed, as well as how electric public utilities responded 
to these policies.  The regression analysis follows with data description, descriptive statistics, and 
results. The paper is rounded out with a conclusion and discussion of the policy implications 
based on the research results. 
 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
 
The quota obligation, commonly called the RPS in the US, is a policy that sets a percentage or 
designated amount of electricity capacity that must come from eligible RE sources, usually by a 
specified date.  Electric utilities or other retail electric providers must provide this set amount of 
green electricity for which, in most cases, they receive renewable energy credits (RECs) that can, 
in some designs, be traded or sold for extra income.  Electric generators or suppliers can acquire 
RECs by constructing and operating RE facilities or, alternatively, they can purchase RECs from 
others.  At the end of the target period(s), electricity generators or suppliers must demonstrate 
that they are in compliance in order to avoid paying a penalty.  The regulatory agent behind the 
RPS determines compliance based on actual renewable electricity contracts, or if RECs are used, 
compliance is demonstrated through the ownership of credits.   
  
4 
The RPS is quickly emerging as a popular mechanism among US state policymakers to 
increase the penetration of RE in the electricity supply mix.  Historically, regulatory agencies 
and state legislatures have been the driving force behind RPS policy formulation, but some 
policies have been adopted through citizen ballot initiatives (Cory and Swezey 2007, 1).  This 
approach, also known as a cap-and-trade if RECs are used, creates a competitive market for 
RECs because RE generators will compete for market share by searching for innovative 
technologies and cost reduction strategies (Huang et al 2007, 5572).  The RPS applies to all 
competitors equally and it relies on the free market to ensure that RE is developed in the most 
economical way.  Furthermore, the RECs built within the RPS scheme encourage the most cost-
effective compliance (Swisher and Porter 2006, 190).  In summary, there are three main reasons 
for its growing popularity: (1) an RPS maintains continuous incentives for RE producers to seek 
cost reductions and can be designed to ensure these reductions are passed on to consumers, (2) 
because an RPS ensures the attainment of a specific market share, it can be directly linked to 
policy targets such as CO2 reduction, and (3) an RPS minimizes government involvement 
relative to other measures as the government’s budget need not be involved and the selection of 
winning bids is made by market forces rather than government evaluation (Berry and Jaccard 
2001, 265). 
 
2.1.1 RPS Design 
 
No RPS policy is designed exactly the same.  It is thus important to understand the major 
components of this policy and the ways in which each RPS can differ.  Three main design 
features are discussed in detail in this section:  the target, eligible resources, and administration. 
First, the RPS target can be mandatory or voluntary.  In the case of US states with an RPS, 30 
states have a mandatory target, while five states have voluntary goals.  Second, the target may 
apply to energy production or installed capacity.  Installed capacity is considered easier to verify 
instead of production, but energy production is more correlated with the desired environmental 
benefits and provides an incentive to maximize the production from individual projects (Berry 
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and Jaccard 2001, 267).  Third, and one of the most obvious design factors, is the size of the 
target in terms of a percentage or designated amount.  Choosing the target size depends in part 
upon the local cost and availability of different RE sources and the price of other energy 
supplies, and ideally, it should be large enough to move the industry towards the environmental 
objective but not so large that it causes significant increases in electricity prices (Berry and 
Jaccard 2001, 266).  In addition to the size, the RPS target must also identify timing specifics as 
lead time may be necessary to permit cost-effective responses.   
Two of the more complicated elements of the RPS target design are whether there should be 
multiple targets and how, if at all, the target should be adjusted.  As will be discussed in a later 
section, many US states are revising their RPS policies to include multiple/separate targets for 
different types of RE sources.  The first approach to the RPS is to set a target for all RE sources, 
but the second and increasingly popular approach is to set separate targets for different classes of 
RE sources.  For example, New York has a two-tiered approach with a Main Tier and a 
Customer-Sited Tier.  Resources eligible for New York’s Main Tier include forms of biomass, 
liquid biofuels, fuel cells, solar PV, and hydroelectric, ocean, tidal, and wind power, while 
resources eligible for the Customer-Sited Tier include fuel cells, solar PV, wind turbines, and 
methane digesters (DSIRE 2009).  The idea behind this new approach is to increase support for 
currently higher-cost technologies and achieve greater energy supply diversity.  As will be 
shown later, grouping RE together without identifying the still expensive RE technologies leads 
to the advancement of the least-cost options and works to the disadvantage of the other RE 
technologies.  It is important to note that both approaches enhance environmental objectives, but 
they differ in the overall up-front costs required. 
The last issue with RPS target design is target adjustment.  When enacting a mandatory RPS, 
there is always the possibility of increasing the electricity price, especially if the target is set too 
high.  To counteract this risk, RPS policies can include a cost cap on RE sources which would 
effectively adjust the target.  It should be noted, however, that changes to the target after 
enactment could jeopardize the credibility and predictability of the policy. 
The second main design feature is the resources deemed eligible for meeting the target.  The 
RPS must specify the eligible resources.  This depends in part upon the objectives of the policy 
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and the local viability of different types of resources as different RE sources will have variable 
costs and benefits (Berry and Jaccard 2001, 267).  While some RPSs limit the eligible resources 
to RE sources of electricity in the strictest sense, others allow for energy efficiency components 
which may include fossil fuel-based cogeneration or fuel cells.  A second issue with resource 
eligibility is whether to allow existing and/or new investments to count towards the target.  
Third, eligible resources must address whether all sources are accepted or only grid-connected 
sources.  The simplest approach is to focus on the grid-transmitted market share of RE, but it is 
argued that the environmental objectives of an RPS are equally served by the development of RE 
anywhere, including off-grid (Berry and Jaccard 2001, 267). 
The third main design feature is administration of the policy.  First, there must be some sort 
of certification of the RE sources.  This could be accomplished through the grid operator or the 
government agency responsible for administering the RPS.  Second, administrators must conduct 
compliance monitoring and, if the policy calls for it, administer non-compliance penalties.  Once 
again, this duty could be accomplished through the grid operator or the government agency 
responsible.  This process is complicated if non-grid production is considered an eligible 
resource.  If this is the case, an additional entity may be required in order to verify compliance.  
Non-compliance penalties are usually handled by the government agency responsible for the 
RPS but could be administered by the grid operator or another entity (Berry and Jaccard 2001, 
268).         
 
2.1.2 RPS Policies in the United States
i
 
 
As of January 2010, mandatory RPS schemes exist in 30 states (including the District of 
Columbia) and five states have non-binding goals.  Figure 1 presents a timeline of RPS policy 
enactment in the US.  It is important to note that many states have revised their policies since the 
date of their first RPS enactment.  Tables 1 and 2 reflect the most recent provisions of each 
state’s policy.     
  
7 
 
Figure 1.  Timeline of US State RPS Policy Enactment 
 The variable compliance targets are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  Note that IOU stands for 
investor-owned utility.  If IOU is listed next to a target, this indicates that the mandatory goal 
listed applies only to these utilities. 
Table 1.  Select Elements of State Mandatory RPS Policies 
State Current Final Target State Current Final Target 
Arizona 15% by 2025 Missouri 15% by 2021 
California 33% by 2020 Montana 15% by 2015 
Colorado 20% by 2020 (IOU) Nevada 25% by 2025 
Connecticut 23% by 2020 New Hampshire 23.8% by 2025 
Delaware 20% by 2019 New Jersey 22.5% by 2021 
District of Columbia 20% by 2022 New Mexico 20% by 2020 (IOU) 
Hawaii 40% by 2030 New York 24% by 2013 
Illinois 25% by 2525 North Carolina 12.5% by 2021 (IOU) 
Iowa 105 MW by 1999 Ohio 12.5% by 2024 
Kansas 20% by 2020 Oregon 25% by 2025 (Large utilities) 
Maine 40% by 2017 Pennsylvania 8.5% by 2020 
Maryland 20% by 2022 Rhode Island 16% by 2019 
Massachusetts 11.1% by 2009 Texas 5880 MW by 2015 
Michigan 10% by 2015 Washington 15% by 2020 
Minnesota 25% by 2025 Wisconsin 10% by 2015 
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Table 2.  Select Elements of State Non-Binding Goals 
State Current Final Target 
North Dakota 10% by 2015 
South Dakota 10% by 2015 
Utah 20% by 2025 
Vermont 20% by 2017 
Virginia 15% by 2025 
 
Of the more than 9,000 megawatts (MW) of new non-hydro RE capacity that has come on line in 
states with an RPS from 1998 through 2008, nearly all added capacity has come from wind 
power, with biomass, solar, and geothermal playing lesser roles (Wiser and Barbose 2009).  
Figure 2 illustrates the actual breakdown of RE capacity additions brought on line by RPS 
policies.   
 
Figure 2.  Total RPS-Motivated Capacity Additions from 1998-2008 
 As anticipated by the design of the policy, experience shows that the RPS promotes 
mainly the lowest-cost technology—which, in the US case, is wind power.  In response to 
technology diversity issues, states have begun to design their policies so as to provide differential 
support to the currently higher-cost RE technologies.  The three most popular solutions are 
technology tiers, set-asides, and credit multipliers.  Table 3 shows the state application of these 
three main solutions to address technology diversity. 
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Table 3.  Current Technology Diversity Policies in US States with an RPS or Non-Binding Goal 
State Technology Tier Set-Aside Credit Multiplier 
Arizona ● ●  
Colorado ● ● ● 
Connecticut ●   
Delaware ● ● ● 
District of Columbia ● ● ● 
Illinois ● ●  
Kansas   ● 
Maine ●  ● 
Maryland ● ● ● 
Massachusetts ● ●  
Minnesota ●   
Missouri ● ● ● 
Montana ●   
Nevada ● ● ● 
New Hampshire ● ●  
New Jersey ● ●  
New Mexico ● ●  
New York ●   
North Carolina ● ●  
Ohio ● ●  
Oregon ● ● ● 
Pennsylvania ● ●  
Texas ●  ● 
Utah   ● 
Virginia   ● 
Washington   ● 
TOTAL 22 16 13 
 
 Several states have established technology tiers as a method of increasing RE 
technology diversity.  Technology tiers consist of different targets for different resources, usually 
with varied schedules and compliance rules.  A technology tier carves out a portion of the RPS 
obligation for a subset of eligible technologies (EPA 2006, 5-9).  The most common technology 
tier approaches include: (1) general resource tiers which classify technologies as class I or II, (2) 
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specific resource tiers which focus on a particular RE source, and (3) specific application tiers 
which work towards customer-sited distributed generation (DG) or community and small-scale 
goals.  Tiers may also exist for technologies that are either new or existing.   
 Some support for technology diversity is provided through set-asides in which a fraction 
of the RPS must be met with certain technologies.  In most cases, target periods are the same as 
those of the overall RPS goal.  Specific resource and specific application technology tiers are 
sometimes considered the same or very similar policies as set-asides. 
 Finally, technology diversity is also supported through credit multipliers in which 
certain technologies provide more than 1 MWh of RECs for each MWh of generation towards 
meeting the RPS targets.  The multipliers may also be used to encourage in-state development.  
Because they grant additional credit, credit multipliers increase the economic incentive for 
developers to install the specified technology (EPA 2006, 5-9).   
 
2.2 WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Worldwide, wind energy has been one of the fastest growing forms of renewable energy in the 
past decade.  In just the US, wind-powered electricity has emerged as the fastest growing source 
of electricity.  The commercial development of grid-connected wind generators started after the 
oil price crises in the 1970s with assistance later in that decade from the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)—a policy that will be discussed in depth later in this 
paper.  In the early 1980s, most commercial wind turbines were assembled using a variety of 
standard components; only blades and control systems were specially tailored for the wind 
turbine industry (IEA 2004, 80).  With increasing market volume, however, a larger number of 
specialized suppliers, including larger companies, are providing tailored components (IEA 2004, 
80).   
From 1990 to 2009, installed wind capacity in the US increased from 1,525 MW to 
34,863 MW (American Wind Energy Association 2004 and US DOE 2009).  From 1990 to 2003, 
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electricity generated from US wind sources increased by 282 percent, while electricity generated 
from other RE sources decreased by 3.2 percent and generation from conventional sources (fossil 
fuels and nuclear power) increased by 30.2 percent (US DOE 2004).  As of 2009, wind capacity 
existed in 36 states, ranging from negligible amounts in several states (Alaska, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont) to 2,798 MW in California, 3,604 MW in Iowa, 
and 9,403 in Texas (US DOE 2009).  A map illustrating current total installed wind capacity 
levels for all US states is included in the appendix.  
In high wind areas, wind power is competitive with other forms of electricity generation 
(IEA 2002, 57).  The cost of wind-produced electricity has declined sharply as wind power 
technology has developed over the decades (IEA 1997, 36).  These trends have been driven by 
environmental concerns, the rising price of natural gas, and the rapidly falling production costs 
for electricity generated from wind turbines that have made it cost competitive with 
thermoelectric generation (Bohn and Lant 2009, 88).  Prices for wind-produced electricity 
decreased from over $61/MWh in 1999 to under $35 in 2005 as the mean capacity of installed 
turbines doubled from 0.7 to 1.4 MW and operation and maintenance costs declined (Wiser and 
Bolinger 2007).  Recently, prices have risen slightly, however, due to increasing demand and an 
increased prices for turbines, most of which are produced in Denmark (Heiman and Solomon 
2004), and possibly because most production efficiency improvements with the current 
technology have been captured.  A 2007 Department of Energy study by Wiser and Bolinger also 
found that wind turbine prices have been rising recently due largely to demand outpacing supply. 
Potential wind energy production in the US is large as the Great Plains region alone has 
the potential to produce twice the current national electricity demands (Swisher, Real de Azua, 
and Clendenin 2001).  Wind potential is also significant offshore in the Pacific Northwest, and 
the Mid-Atlantic coastline has a generation potential of 330,000 MW compared to the region’s 
current electricity use, which is estimated at 73,000 MW (Bryant 2007). 
It should also be noted that success with wind power in the US has been frequently tied to 
the federal production tax credit (PTC).  An incentive within the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 
1992, the PTC allows a business with taxable income to claim a tax credit for every kilowatt 
hour (kWh) of generation for the first 10 years of a project’s operation (Swisher and Porter 2006, 
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188).  Referring to Figure 3, the US experienced drastic decreases in annual wind installations 
three times within the past ten years—each decrease correlating to the expiration of the PTC.  In 
recent years, however, many are attributing increases in wind installations to the rise in the 
number of RPS policies adopted by US states.  The literature suggesting this correlation between 
RPSs and wind power adoption will be reviewed in the next section and will be a research focus 
in this paper.    
 
 
Figure 3.  Annual Installed US Wind Power Capacity (American Wind Energy Association 
2009) 
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Although RPS policies began in earnest in the late 1990s, it took several years for literature to 
start recognizing the impact of an RPS on wind power growth.  In a 2003 National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory publication, Bird et al. found RPSs to be the most important driving force 
behind US wind power development, and in a 2005 presentation to the National Wind 
Coordinating Committee, Ryan Wiser calculated that state RPS policies were responsible for 47 
percent of US wind development from 2001 to 2004.  Most recently in 2007, Wiser and Bolinger 
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estimated that between the years 2001-2006 approximately 50 percent of the wind power 
capacity built in the US was motivated to some extent by state RPSs.  Now, nearly all studies on 
wind power development recognize RPS policies as a major driving force behind this 
development.   
 Most of the research that has addressed this topic consists of studies that identify factors 
that drive development of wind and/or other RE sources.  In 2002, Gouchoe et al. examined 10 
state financial incentive programs in six states using a case-study approach to determine the main 
factors that influence their effectiveness at stimulating deployment of RE technologies.  A 2003 
study by Langniss and Wiser reviews the implementation of Texas’s RPS concluding that a 
properly designed and carefully implemented RPS can be an effective support mechanism for RE 
development.  Also in 2003, Deyette et al. evaluated the commitment of states to support RE 
sources by comparing projected RPS commitments, renewable electricity funding, and state RE 
purchases with each state’s renewable electricity generation and RE potential.  In 2005 Bird et al. 
explored the main factors and market drivers in the 12 states where a significant amount of wind 
energy had been developed or planned.  These factors included RPS, federal and state financial 
incentives, consumer demand for green energy, and natural gas prices.  Also, published in 2005, 
Menz and Vachon analyzed the contribution to wind power development of several state-level 
policies, including RPSs, fuel generation disclosure rules, mandatory green power options, 
public benefits funds, and electricity retail choice facilitated by electricity market restructuring.  
More recently, in 2007, Adelaja and Hailu estimated the impacts of RPS adoption on Michigan 
by projecting installed wind capacity and predicting the impact on investment, employment, 
earnings, and lease payments to land owners.  This paper uses Adelaja and Hailu’s wind capacity 
installation determination model to design the regression analysis in part two of the research. 
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4.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
The research in this paper takes on a two-stage design with past regulatory policies being 
observed first, as well as how electric utilities responded to these policies.  The second stage of 
the research utilizes newly generated and other publicly available data to conduct a quantitative 
analysis of wind power adoption in US states using regression analysis. 
 
4.1 PART ONE 
 
Because the RPS is essentially a regulatory mandate, it is helpful to observe previous regulatory 
policies affecting the electric industry in the US.  Stage one of the research examines four past 
regulatory policies affecting electric utilities:  PURPA, the Clean Air Act and its amendments, 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), and EPAct of 1992.  The background and nature of the policy is 
discussed, as well as the manner in which electric utilities reacted and responded to the policy.   
 
4.2 PART TWO 
 
For this analysis, data are aggregated by state; fifteen states that lack a mandatory or voluntary 
RPS policy are excluded (see Tables 1 and 2 for a list of states included).  The prediction is 
based on an econometric model from Adelaja and Hailu that estimates the relationships between 
installed wind power capacity and its hypothesized determinants using cross section data from 
US states with an RPS.  In Adelaja and Hailu’s study, a wind capacity installation determination 
model is used to econometrically estimate the impacts of RPS adoption on wind power adoption.  
The details of the data and the wind determination model are provided in the section on part two 
of the analysis.  The analysis in this paper will be based on a 35-state model of wind installations 
by RPS adopters over a ten year period (1999-2009).  Data on installed wind power capacity in 
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MW as of 2009 were derived from the Department of Energy’s Wind Powering America site. 
The approach in this study is to model Installed Wind Power Capacity (IWPC) measured in MW 
as a dependent variable regressed against hypothesized determinants.   
 
5.0 ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 PART ONE:  PREDECESSOR REGULATORY MANDATES AND ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES’ RESPONSE 
 
As opposed to Denmark and Germany, where local cooperatives have been a major factor in the 
growth of wind power, 90 percent of US wind power capacity is owned by independent power 
producers (Wiser and Bolinger 2007).  Twenty-five percent of new capacity built in 2006 was 
initiated by IOUs with only four percent coming from community-owned wind power (Bohn and 
Lant 2009, 89).  Wind power has been facilitated by the increase in environmental standards 
facing electric utilities.  Electric utilities in the US are among the most environmentally sensitive 
industries in the country.  They are heavily exposed to the impacts of environmental regulations 
and have undergone a number of changes within the past 30 years to comply with state and 
federal regulatory policies.  Several of these policies will discussed in this section, but it is 
important to first discuss the background of the industry and all of the changes that have been 
overshadowed by its regulation and restructuring. 
Since the mid-1930s, electric utilities have been subject to comprehensive federal and 
state economic regulation.  Until the late 1970s, this regulatory framework remained virtually 
unchanged.  Electricity service is considered a natural monopoly, meaning that the industry has 
(1) a tendency toward declining long-term costs, (2) high threshold investment, and (3) 
technological conditions that limit the amount of potential entrants (Abel 1998).  In 1935, the 
federal regulation scheme was codified with the Federal Utility Act, and the most notable 
features of this act were the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Public Utilities Holding Company 
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Act (PUHCA) which defined the nature of federal electric utility regulation.   As the industry 
evolved, however, flaws with the natural monopoly theory developed.  Because exclusive 
franchises in the utility’s service area are granted by the government and several utilities do not 
own all of their generating facilities, there is actually nothing natural about a utility’s monopoly.    
Restructuring of the electricity industry began in 1996 with California and Rhode Island 
leading the way at the state-level passing legislation allowing retail customers to choose their 
electricity source (Menz and Vachon 2006, 1788).    Since then, over twenty states have adopted 
electricity restructuring legislation, but the process has been delayed or indefinitely suspended in 
eight states following difficulties in 2001 in California.  In the states that have gone through with 
the restructuring process, retail customers have access to various sources of electricity and 
service providers.  As part of the process, electricity distribution companies have been pressured 
to inform the public about RE choices, thus facilitating market entry by wind power and other 
―green‖ electricity producers. 
 
5.1.1 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
 
The oil crises of the 1970s raised concerns about the security of US energy and electricity 
supply, and these concerns led to PURPA being signed into law in 1978 as part of the National 
Energy Act.  PURPA required utilities to purchase electricity produced by non-utility entities, 
sources directly competitive with the utilities' own generation, and encouraged the development 
of small-scale electric generation facilities, particularly those using renewable resources (Menz 
and Vachon 2006, 1788).  The policy’s overarching goals were to encourage energy conservation 
and energy efficiency and stimulate the development of generation of electricity from RE 
sources.  The changes the policy made to traditional electricity regulation started a movement 
towards a market-oriented approach to electricity supply (Abel 1998, 1).   
In addition to giving the federal government regulatory power in the domain of economic 
regulation of electric power (formerly the responsibility of the states), PURPA also augmented 
utilities’ electricity generation with more efficiently produced electricity, provided equitable 
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rates to consumers, and created a new type of wholesale generators called Qualifying Facilities 
(QFs) (Abel 1998, 2).  QFs are exempt from regulation under PUHCA and FPA, and only two 
types of generators—small power producers and co-generators—can qualify as a QF to receive 
the benefits of PURPA.  All of the power produced by QFs had to be purchased by the local 
utilities in their service area at avoided cost which is defined as ―the likely costs for both energy 
and facilities that would have been incurred by the purchasing utility if that utility had to provide 
its own generating capacity‖ (Abel 1998, 3).  
PURPA created several issues for electric utilities as a whole.  First, because the policy 
opened up the electricity generating sector to other entrants, electric utilities questioned the 
justification of the natural monopoly of generation ownership and regulation.  Secondly, the 
cost-based rates that originally guided wholesale transactions also came into question since QFs 
usually do not have enough market power to influence the rates they charge and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) began to approve certain rates that came from 
competitive bidding.  These particular rates, commonly called market-based rates, were 
instrumental in moving electricity towards a market approach.  It is argued, however, that this 
push towards a competitive market was not the workings of the free market.  While PURPA did 
introduce competitive generators into the electricity market, it did so using regulatory 
intervention. 
In one particular state, California, electric utilities had a more specific problem with 
PURPA.  In the mid-1990s, the FERC disapproved of California's allocation of PURPA 
contracts.  The California Commission structured a proposal based on a Biennial Resource Plan 
Updated (BRPU), the establishment of "benchmark prices" and bidding by the QFs (Cudahy 
1995, 430).  Interestingly enough, California reserved around half of the capacity solely for RE 
bidders.  As expected, electric utilities under the California Commission's rule complained that 
California's system would result in unnecessary power being purchased at inflated prices.  More 
specifically, electric utilities in California alleged that the solicitations to QFs brought in bids 
from cogeneration facilities at prices below what had been awarded for some RE capacity; that 
portions of the solicitations were set aside for RE bidding; that the bids were segmented into 
separate capacity blocks; that the bids were distorted to reflect environmental externalities; that 
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the final orders ignored updated need projections; that the solicitations were not open to non-QF 
bidders; and that the orders threatened to create stranded costs in a restructured electric utility 
industry (Cudahy 1995, 430). 
The FERC found fault in California’s method of calculating avoided cost.  The agency 
noted that it, and not the states, had the authority to make the rules governing QF rates and that 
any state process to determine avoided costs had to also follow the FERC’s statutes and 
regulations.  Overall, the problem made the FERC draw a line between internalized 
environmental costs, which had become pecuniary costs of the electric utility, and costs to 
society which had not yet been internalized (Cudahy 1995, 431). 
 
5.1.2 The Clean Water Act 
 
CWA has its origins as far back as 1948 with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.  This was 
the first in depth statement of federal interest in clean water programs, and because water 
pollution was mainly viewed as a state and local problem, it provided local and state 
governments with funds to address water pollution problems.  During the late 1950s and into the 
1960s, several laws amended this 1948 statute.  These new laws dealt largely with federal 
assistance to municipal dischargers and with federal enforcement programs for all dischargers 
(Copeland 2008, 2).  Mounting negative perceptions and frustrations with the water pollution 
programs led to more amendments in 1972.  The 1972 amendments established two major goals 
that still remain today:  zero discharge of pollutants and that water quality is both ―fishable‖ and 
swimmable‖ (Copeland 2008, 2).   
Today, CWA consists of two main components:  regulatory requirements and Title II and 
VI which relate to municipal sewage treatment plant construction.  The component of interest in 
this research is that of the regulatory requirements which apply to industrial and municipal 
dischargers.  CWA is termed a technology-forcing statute because it places rigorous demands on 
those who are regulated by it (including electric utilities) to achieve higher and higher levels of 
pollution abatement (Copeland 2008, 3).  Industries had to install best available technology that 
is economically achievable to clean up waste discharges.       
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 CWA directly affects electric utilities as water is critical to the functioning of most 
electric generation facilities.  Utilities often rely on cooling water impoundments to reduce the 
temperature of the water used to cool steam electric plants.  These plants also frequently depend 
on water to operate and cool turbines and isolate and manage generation process emissions and 
wastes (Edison Electric Institute 2007, 1).  Under section 402 of the CWA, generating facilities 
that discharge into navigable waters are required to obtain permits.   
 The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) definition of waters in the US specifies 
that waste treatment systems designed to meet the requirements of the CWA are not waters of the 
US (Edison Electric Institute 2007, 5).  This exception for cooling ponds and other treatment 
facilities has been critical for electric utilities.  Many have built ash ponds, cooling ponds, and 
settling basins to treat pollutants, and these solutions have been considered industrial facilities 
for pollution control and as exceptions by the EPA.  The waters from these facilities therefore do 
not have to meet water quality standards until the point of discharge from the systems into 
jurisdictional waters.   
 The RPS can also be considered a technology-forcing statute because it requires states 
to utilize certain technologies to meet the target.  As observed in this example, electric utilities 
have opted to search for exceptions to the regulation.  In the case of the currently proposed 
federal RPS policies where energy efficiency can be called upon as an exception in extraordinary 
circumstances to meet the target amount, this example indicates that states and electric utilities 
will push for these exceptions in order to minimize the impact upon their budgets.   
 
5.1.3 The Clean Air Act and its Amendments  
 
The Clean Air Act aims to limit airborne emissions through investment in cleaner technologies 
and daily operations and protect the environment and humans from harmful air pollutants.  
Minimum national standards for air quality were established under the act, and it established a 
comprehensive permit system for all major sources of air pollution including electric utilities and 
power plants.  While regulation has curbed emissions, the policy has had other unintended and 
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potentially costly effects on the electric industry and its decisions.  This section will 
chronologically discuss the act and its amendments and how electric utilities responded.  
 In 1970, the Clean Air Act Amendments were passed required the EPA to establish air 
standards for six major pollutants including sulfur dioxide (SO2).  These amendments required 
all new or modified electric power plants (both coal-fired and oil-fired plants) to limit their SO2 
emissions.  It was expected that power plants would meet these standards by installing pollution 
abatement capital such as flue gas desulfurization systems, known more commonly as scrubbers 
(Lee 2002, 492).  Most plants, however, chose instead to purchase low-sulfur coal for their new 
plants because it was the most economical choice.  According to Lee, these amendments and the 
choices of power plants increased the demand for low-sulfur coal by 29.6 percent and reduced 
the demand for high-sulfur coal by 0.7 percent (2002).  In order to protect the employment of 
high-sulfur miners and counter the relocation of US coal production, policymakers enacted 
further regulation in 1977 requiring plants to install scrubbers (Lee 2002, 492).  As noted in 
Lee’s 2002 research study, the sulfur regulations reduced the average annual rate of productivity 
growth by 1.52 percent for power plants illustrating the costly effect of regulation on the 
industry.        
In 1990, the Clean Air Act was amended to establish a regulatory framework and criteria 
for minimizing pollutants from various sources including power plants.  The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 added an acid deposition control program setting goals for the year 2000 
of reducing annual SO2 emissions by 10 million tons from 1980 levels and reducing annual NOx 
emissions by 2 million tons, also from 1980 levels (McCarthy et al. 2007, 14).  The SO2 
reductions were imposed in two phases. Under Phase 1, owners/operators of 111 electric 
generating facilities larger than 100 MW had to meet tonnage emission limitations by January 1, 
1995, and Phase 2 included facilities larger than 75 MW, with a deadline of January 1, 2000 
(McCarthy et al. 2007, 14).  As a result of the 1990 amendments, many utilities switched their 
plants to run on natural gas (Calvert and Hock 2001, 4).  Rising prices for natural gas, however, 
have caused utilities to look to other low-emission options for electricity generation, such as 
wind power. 
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A key finding from the observation of the Clean Air Act and its amendments and electric 
utilities’ responses is that, unless a compliance option is specified, electric utilities will opt for 
the least-cost plan towards meeting regulatory standards.  As shown in the section on US state 
RPS policies, this has held true thus far in terms of wind power and RE sources.  Just as 
subsequent amendments to this policy enforced the use of scrubbers, an increasing number of 
states are amending their RPS policy to include set-asides and technology tiers.   
 
5.1.4 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
 
EPAct of 1992, in regards to competition within the sector, followed in the footsteps of PURPA.  
The policy increased competition in the electricity generating sector by creating new entities that 
can generate and sell electricity at wholesale prices without being regulated as utilities under 
PUHCA (Abel 1998, 4).  As already noted in the section on wind power, EPAct is also important 
for establishing the PTC whose expirations and subsequent re-enactments have been directly 
correlated to the booms and busts of the wind industry.  In this section, only the manner in which 
EPAct affected competition is observed as the PTC does not heavily impact electric utilities.   
 As PURPA began a shift towards more regulatory responsibilities for the federal 
government, EPAct continued that shift away from the states by creating new options for utilities 
and regulators to meet electricity demand (Abel 1998, 1).  EPAct came about because, following 
PURPA, there were still issues calling for further reform.  Voiced by independent power 
producers (IPPs) and some utilities, the main concern was that IPPs should be exempt from 
PUHCA regulation which was making their companies overly complex in structure.  EPAct 
therefore created new entities that can generate and sell electricity at wholesale without being 
regulated as a utility under PUHCA. 
 EPAct established exempt wholesale generators (EWGs) and foreign utility companies 
(FUCOs) as entities that are not considered electric utilities and are thus exempt from the FPA 
and PUHCA (Abel 1998, 5).  Because of the creation of EWGs and the policy’s wheeling 
provisions, EPAct is considered an example of US commitment to competition in the electricity 
sector.  The commitment to competition, however, is bundled with a renewed interest in 
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diversifying the supply mix and energy conservation.  EPAct requires states to consider 
cogeneration and RE resources, and the policy also provides that rates should be set at levels that 
will encourage utilities to make investments in demand-side management (Cudahy 1995, 427).       
 Overall, EPAct further opened the electricity market to competitive wholesale generation 
and required electric utilities to open their transmission lines to all electricity producers thus 
allowing alternative energy—such as wind power—access to the electricity market (Menz and 
Vachon 2006, 1788).  With the increase in competition (and electricity market restructuring), 
however, the expiration of transitional rate caps resulted in higher prices as utilities were able to 
adjust rates to recover higher distribution and transmission costs, in addition to higher wholesale 
power costs (US EIA 2007).  Most of the price increases were attributed to market restructuring 
which resulted in the suspension or modification of the process, but EPAct also played a role in 
competition increasing retail rates.  This example serves to prove that, when it is possible, 
electric utilities will distribute the costs of regulation to consumers.  As policymakers consider 
additional regulatory mandates such as RPSs, it is vital to consider the impact the regulation will 
have on energy prices for consumers.   
 
5.2 PART TWO 
 
5.2.1 Data Description 
 
For each, the source of data and hypothesized effect on installed wind power adoption are 
indicated.   
1. Target time frame (positive) – This is the number of years between the date of adoption 
and the target year.  Target time frame is labeled TMFR in the model. 
2. Time since RPS adoption (positive) – This is the current number of years since RPS 
adoption.  Time since RPS adoption is labeled TSINC in the model. 
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3. Target amount/percentage (positive) – This is the portion of the state’s energy supply that 
is mandated to be renewable.  The target amount/percentage is labeled TAMOU in the 
model. 
4. Whether RPS is mandatory (positive) or voluntary (negative) – This is labeled MVSV in 
the model.  
 
The first four data factors were collected from Wiser and Barbose’s 2009 update to their 
Department of Energy study on RPS policies and the Database for State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE).  These four factors characterize the RPS target and will 
help estimate the effect of each target element of RPS legislation on wind power capacity 
installation.  This should indicate the trade-offs involved when designing the RPS target. 
 
5. Wind energy potential (positive) – Although it appears obvious that a state’s wind 
potential would positively impact its deployed capacity, with or without an RPS, it is 
important to measure the strength of the correlation.  The relationship is hypothesized as 
positive since the more available wind resources a state has, the more likely developers 
will target the state for wind power installations.  Data is the total windy land area in km
2
 
that has 30 percent gross capacity factor at 80 meters.  The data was collected from the 
US Department of Energy’s Wind Powering America wind resource estimates (2010).  
Wind energy potential is labeled WPOT in the model. 
6. Wind energy price (negative) - National average prices for wind power are competitive, 
but in 2006 they varied by region from $27 per megawatt hour (MWh) in Texas to $48 
per MWh in the Northeast (Wiser and Bolinger 2007).  The demand for wind energy was 
thus affected in comparison to electricity prices from other sources and to the extent that 
it is elastic.  The relationship is therefore hypothesized to be negative.  Data was 
collected from the studies on wind power in US states from Bohn and Lant (2009) and 
Wiser and Bolinger (2007).  Wind energy price is labeled WPRI in the model.   
7. Restructuring (negative) – Due to economies of scale and the efficiencies of a single 
delivery system, electricity distribution is regarded as a natural monopoly. Its production, 
however, is not.  Following 1992’s EPAct, several states have restructured the electric 
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industry by forcing electric utilities to sell their power generation facilities.  This has thus 
created a regulated monopoly regime for utilities that specialize in electricity distribution 
and a more competitive free market regime for electricity producers (Heiman 2006).   In 
their 2004 study, Heiman and Solomon found that, under electric utility market 
restructuring, RE generation must overcome challenges such as price distortions, lack of 
storage capability, discriminatory transmission system access, and the end of linked 
utility rate hikes guaranteed to cover the additional expense of RE generation.  Data was 
collected from the US Energy Information Administration’s site on the status of 
electricity restructuring by states (2010).  Note that the data is recorded as being 
restructured or not; for those states that have suspended restructuring, their data is 
recorded as being restructured since the process has begun.  Restructuring is labeled 
RESTR in the model.   
8. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State (positive) - A state’s economic and financial 
situation is expected to impact policy choices that affect consumers and the industry.  
Consistent with the findings of Huang et al. (2007), each state’s GDP is hypothesized to 
be positively related to the capacity installation of wind power.  Data was collected from 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and is reported for the year 2008 (2010).  GDP by 
state is labeled SGDP in the model. 
9. Population Change (positive) – Because as a state grows more populous, the more energy 
it demands thus straining existing resources, population change is hypothesized to be 
positively related to the capacity installation of wind power.  Data is the percent change 
from April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 and was collected from the US Census Bureau (2010).  
Population change is labeled POP in the model. 
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Table 4.  Summary of Analysis Variables 
Field Description 
TMFR # of years between the date of adoption and the target year 
TSINC # of years since RPS adoption 
TAMOU % of the state’s energy supply that is mandated to be renewable 
MVSV Dummy variable: 1 = Mandatory, 0 = Voluntary 
WPOT Total windy land area that has 30% gross capacity factor at 80 m (km
2
) 
WPRI Wind energy price (2006) ($/MWh) 
RESTR Dummy variable: 1 = Restructuring has started/is complete, 0 = No 
restructuring 
SGDP Gross domestic product by state in 2008 (millions of chained 2000 $) 
POP % population change from 4/1/2000 to 07/01/2008 
 
5.2.2 Wind Power Capacity Installation Determination Model 
 
To determine the structure of wind capacity installation by states with an RPS, the wind power 
capacity installation determination model is specified. The model estimates the relationships 
between determinants of wind capability installation and installed wind power capacity (IWPC) 
using the above discussed data. The model is specified as follows. 
IWPC = α0 + α1 TMFR + α2 TSINC + α3 TAMOU + α4 MVSV +  
α5 WPOT + α6 WPRI + α7 RESTR + α8 SGDP + α9 POP + ε 
 
  
26 
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
One of the most reliable sources of data on wind power capacity in the US is the Department of 
Energy’s Wind Powering America program.  Data is provided for the past ten years (1999-2009) 
in MW.  Data transformation was conducted to appropriately integrate the data and modeling 
process, and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method is used in the wind capacity 
installation determination model. 
Table 5 provides a list and description of the variables used in estimating the wind 
capacity installation equation.  The model has strong performance, with R
2
 of 79.3%, meaning 
that it explains 79.3% of the variation in state wind capacity installation.  Table 6 provides an 
overview of the model performance indicators.   
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics 
    Model Estimates 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient p-value 
Dependent Variable 
IWPC 33 929.12 1768.17   
Independent Variables 
TMFR 33 16.55 5.82 -.009 .956 
TSINC 33 7.39 5.68 .245 .066 
TAMOU 33 18.54 7.09 .050 .659 
MVSV 33 0.85 0.36 .032 .776 
WPOT 33 61675.76 97127.64 .858 .000 
WPRI 33 40.76 8.22 .278 .218 
RESTR 33 0.64 0.49 -.117 .362 
SGDP 33 273935.55 3.22E5 .365 .004 
POP 33 7.87 7.44 .189 .164 
   
Table 6.  Model Performance Indicators 
R
2
 0.793 
Adjusted R
2
 0.713 
F-value 9.819 
F-Prob. Value 0.000 
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5.2.4 OLS Regression Results 
 
Only one of the factors that characterize the RPS target was found to be statistically significant:  
the time since RPS adoption.  As hypothesized, the relationship was positive illustrating that, 
with time, wind capacity installation will grow after RPS adoption.  These findings are 
confirmed by plotting the number of states with RPS policies versus wind power capacity in the 
US (see Figure 4).     
 
 
Figure 4.  Prevalence of RPS Policies and Wind Capacity Installation 
 
Wind energy potential was also found to be statistically significant.  As hypothesized, the 
relationship was positive illustrating that wind potential provides a signal to the industry that 
there are wind resources to tap.  Wind energy potential was the most important factor in 
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determining state wind capacity installation.  The results show that for a one standard deviation 
increase in wind energy potential, the state would expect a 0.858 standard deviation increase in 
wind capacity installation.  This is nearly a one-to-one ratio which illustrates the significance of 
wind resources in a state for increasing capacity. 
A surprising outcome of the analysis was the finding that wind energy price had a 
positive relationship with wind capacity installation.  It appears that even if the price of wind 
power increases there is still a demand for it when an RPS is in place.  This may be because, 
relative to other RE sources, wind power is still the least-cost option for meeting the RPS target.  
Another cause for this positive relationship could be that the PTC makes wind power desirable 
despite an increase in wind energy prices. 
Both state GDP and population change were found to be statistically significant, and as 
anticipated, both factors had a positive relationship with wind capacity installation.  The finding 
that the size of a state’s economy positively impacts the growth of its installed wind power 
capacity may suggest that large states, in an economic sense, are faced with more pressure to 
implement policies that strengthen the gains from RPS adoption due to the high energy price tag 
and burdens and the potential gains from economies-of-scale (Adelaja and Hailu 2007).  In terms 
of population change, it appears the hypothesis that as a state grows more populous, the more 
energy it demands thus straining existing resources, was correct.  Because most states have 
already fully tapped into their significant hydropower resources, wind is the second-best RE 
source for states to progress towards as they try to shift away from fossil fuel-based sources. 
 Several variables were not found to be statistically significant determinants of installed 
wind capacity.  Hence, a state’s wind capacity installation is not affected by the RPS target size, 
the RPS target timeframe, whether the policy is mandatory or voluntary, and whether the state’s 
electricity market has been restructured. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The world has seen global energy use expand at unprecedented rates to keep up with the 
demands of growing economies and populations. This growth process is complicated, however, 
by complex, interconnected issues involving climate change mitigation, economic development, 
and energy security.  RE technologies have emerged as an answer for many countries’ energy 
problems, satisfying the need for cleaner technology while still expanding energy supplies as a 
tool for further economic development. Unfortunately, these new technologies face several 
market challenges which have necessitated government intervention.  The quota obligation 
(known as the RPS in the US) is one of the most popular policy tools for encouraging RE 
capacity expansion.   
Evidence suggests that the RPS is a key driving force behind the growth in installed wind 
power capacity in the US (see Figure 4).  The first analysis in the paper observed past regulatory 
policies and applied what was learned from their implementation to the RPS.  The manner in 
which electric utilities responded was also examined to determine how they may respond to 
further regulatory mandates such as a federal RPS.  The second analysis utilized data from the 35 
states with an RPS in estimating a structural model of wind power development which accounts 
for particular characteristics of the RPS target and other drivers of wind power development such 
as state economic and population factors.  This research adds to this evidence by showing that 
several other factors play a key role in increasing wind capacity within US states besides just the 
RPS.  These factors include a state’s wind energy potential, state GDP, and state population 
change.  Additionally, it was found that there is a momentum effect associated with time since 
RPS adoption and that increases in wind energy prices do not negatively affect development in 
states with an RPS.   
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6.1 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
There are currently two main bills—The American Clean Energy Leadership Act (ACELA) by 
Senator Bingaman and The American Clean Energy Security Act (ACES) by Representative 
Waxman and Representative Markey—in Congress introducing a federal RPS.  With a large 
number of US states already enacting such policies at the state-level, observing the experiences 
of these states with this policy and understanding how to best design and implement it should be 
a key goal for policymakers entering discussions on ACELA and ACES.  This paper focused on 
the role of the RPS on one particular renewable resource—wind power—in the US.   
 The first stage of the research observed past regulatory policies in the electricity sector 
and analyzed the manner in which electric utilities responded to these policies.  The key finding 
from this observation was quite obvious:  electric utilities will respond to regulatory policies in 
the best manner which facilitates their budgets and will work to find exceptions, if possible, that 
allow them to practice least-cost methods of adaptation to the regulation.  In relation to the RPS, 
this has already occurred with most states seeing wind power (currently the least-cost RE source 
in the US) increase rapidly to meet the demands of RPS targets.  As was the case with the Clean 
Air Act and its amendments, policymakers have adapted policies to better specify the outcomes 
they wish to achieve with the regulatory mandate.  Depending on the desired outcomes of the 
policy, this research indicates that regulation is best designed with specific implementation 
requirements. 
 The second stage of the research conducted a regression analysis to determine the 
indicators of wind capacity installation.  Surprisingly, only one characteristic of the RPS target—
the time since RPS adoption—was statistically significant.  This illustrates the importance, 
however, of allowing sufficient time for a state to meet preliminary targets (if there are any).  
Furthermore, it shows that there are minimal trade-offs in the design of the target and that, in 
time, wind power will increase regardless of the stringency of the policy.  Capacity expansion is 
instead more reliant on the availability of resources and the state economy.  Also, the research 
indicates that as the population of a state grows, there is more likelihood to increase wind power 
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installation.  This is the probable result of increasing demands for energy placing a strain on 
current sources and creating a demand for new sources to come online.  While this study 
demonstrates that the design of the RPS is not a critical factor for wind power adoption, it 
reasserts that RPS policies are nonetheless important to RE promotion.  In all states that had 
adopted an RPS policy, either mandatory or non-binding, an increase in wind power capacity 
was observed.  The differences in the growth of the capacity were better explained, however, by 
factors other than the target design features of the policy.        
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APPENDIX 
 
TOTAL INSTALLED WIND POWER CAPACITY IN US STATES 
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